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The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in MH v UK
highlights the shortcomings in Britain’s mental health law
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled in MH v UK that the inability of a woman with Down’s
Syndrome to challenge her detention in a hospital under the Mental Health Act 1983 violated her human rights.
Claire Overman argues that this judgment throws a spotlight on the issue of the protection available to those
with mental illnesses, and demonstrates that there are shortcomings in the existing regime of admission to







individuals suf f ering
f rom mental disorder
is not inherently
unjustif iable. Article
5(1)(e) of  the
Convention
specif ically allows f or
an exception to the
right to liberty with
regard to “persons of
unsound mind.” The
issue with respect to
the Mental Health Act
is that it f ails to
accord suf f icient
importance to the liberty of  individuals, by allowing medical practit ioners a broad discretion to authorise
detention when it is perceived to be in their best interests.
Under section 2, an individual may be detained in a hospital f or up to 28 days f or assessment, on the
grounds that:
“(a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which warrants the detention of
the patient in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment followed by medical treatment) for at
least a limited period; and
(b) he ought to be so detained in the interests of his own health or safety or with a view to the
protection of other persons.”
An application f or admission under section 2 must be f ounded on the written recommendation of  two
registered medical practit ioners, who must state that the conditions f or detention are satisf ied.
Section 2 brings into sharp relief  a conf lict of  institutional competence, as it provides that medical
practit ioners are to determine whether the legislative conditions are f ulf illed. It seems that, in general, the
medical prof ession is better placed than a court to decide whether the individual is suf f ering f rom a mental
disorder warranting assessment in a hospital. As the European Court has previously stressed, it is
desirable that the existence of  mental disorder is verif ied by objective medical expertise, to prevent powers
of  detention being misused against those who may simply have views or behaviour which deviate f rom the
norm. However, the case of  St George’s NHS Trust v S demonstrates that medical opinion is not inf allible.
In this case a pregnant woman was detained under section 2 on the basis that she ref used treatment f or
pre-eclampsia, despite the high risk of  death f or her and her unborn child. The Court of  Appeal held that,
contrary to the medical practit ioners’ concerns, a ref usal by a competent adult, however unreasonable, of
medical intervention could not amount to a “mental disorder” under section 2(2)(a).
A f urther issue is that the question of  whether an individual should be detained in the interests of  his own
health and saf ety or f or protection of  others is also determined by the medical prof ession. Yet we may ask
whether this is an appropriate question f or medical practit ioners to address. It is not inherently medical in
nature: rather, as it involves a weighing up of  the liberty of  an individual against the protection of  himself  or
others, it would seem to f all within the sphere of  competence of  the courts. There may be a risk of
divergence between the medical prof ession and the courts with respect to what each would consider to
represent a danger to the individual. In particular, a court is required to consider the importance of  the
individual’s right to liberty. On the other hand, the medical prof ession may unduly priorit ise the patient’s
state of  health and his need f or hospital treatment.
A Code of  Practice exists to provide guidance to medical practit ioners relying on section 2. This Code lays
out a series of  f actors to be considered when determining whether admission to hospital is appropriate. In
it, there are some indications of  the importance of  a patient’s right to liberty. For instance, paragraph 4.4
states:
“Bef ore it is decided that admission to hospital is necessary, consideration must be given to whether there
are alternative means of  providing the care and treatment which the patient requires.”
However, this Code is f or guidance only, and is not binding. There is theref ore a risk that such
recommendations will be overlooked. The Code is also very broad in the f actors which it permits medical
practit ioners to consider f or the purposes of  authorising admission to a hospital under section 2. For
example, paragraph 4.6, af ter listing specif ic ways in which an individual may be considered to be putting
himself  at risk, also includes, as a f actor, “that their mental disorder is otherwise putting their health or
saf ety at risk.” This breadth undermines any idea that the liberty of  the individual is also a primary
consideration.
The Right to Challenge Detention
Article 5(4) of  the European Convention on Human Rights states that “everyone who is deprived of  his
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entit led to take proceedings by which the lawf ulness of  his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if  the detention is not lawf ul.” However, as the
Court f ound in MH, under the Mental Health Act there are limited opportunit ies f or an individual to challenge
his detention in a hospital during the 28 day assessment period. Section 66 of  the Mental Health Act
provides that an individual may make an application f or discharge to a Mental Health Review Tribunal within
the f irst f ourteen days of  detention. However, as was the case in MH, this proves useless if  the individual
lacks the capacity to make an application. Certain close relatives are able, under section 23, to make an
application on behalf  of  the individual. However, under section 25, if  this is ref used because in the opinion
of  the responsible clinician he is dangerous to others or to himself , then the relative is barred f rom making
a f urther order f or six months.
As the European Court noted in MH, there is theref ore a problem where the detainee himself  is incapable
of  making an application, and where the relative has also been barred. It pointed out that “special
saf eguards are called f or in the case of  detained mental patients who lack legal capacity to institute
proceedings bef ore judicial bodies.” In particular, there is a danger of  conf usion between lack of  capacity
and dangerousness. It in no way f ollows that, simply by virtue of  the f act that an individual lacks capacity,
he necessarily represents a danger to himself  or others, of  a kind warranting detention in a hospital. Yet
the absence of  opportunity f or those who lack capacity to challenge their detention means that we risk lack
of  capacity itself  becoming the de f acto criterion f or detention.
Mental illness is an area in which policy is continually evolving, due to developments in medical
understanding. It is crucial that the law adapts to ref lect this. However, as the case of  MH shows, there
remain shortcomings in the present system of  saf eguards f or those who are detained f or assessment
under the Mental Health Act. In particular, the present system allows medical practit ioners to make value
judgments as to whether detention is in an individual’s best interests, and f ails to emphasise the
importance of  the right to liberty. Further, there is insuf f icient support f or those who lack capacity to
meaningf ully challenge such decisions.
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